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Abstract 
Recent studies on Closed-Loop Supply Chains have highlighted the need of 
empirical research to identify the relative importance of market determinants. In this 
paper we shed light on the market determinants of price differentials between new 
and remanufactured products in Electronics by using data on purchases made on 
eBay UK. The empirical analysis is carried out by means of linear regression 
methods which are capable of controlling for the presence of collinearity among the 
explanatory variables. Our empirical results suggest seller positive reputation, the 
length of warranties, the proxies of demand and supply of remanufactured products, 
the duration and end day of remanufactured product listings are important 
determinants of price differentials. Most importantly, we find seller identity plays an 
important role as our empirical results are predominantly driven by transactions 
carried out by non manufacturer-approved vendors. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Remanufacturing can be defined as “returning a used product to at least its 
original performance with a warranty that is equivalent to or better than that of the 
newly manufactured product” (British Standards, BS8887: Part 2 2009). This implies 
that remanufactured products are allegedly, in terms of product performance, identical 
to their corresponding new products. Through a stringent remanufacturing process, 
used products are disassembled, serviced, tested and their components are repaired, 
replaced or processed to attain like-new condition. In a market environment, the 
remanufacturing process can be carried out by Original Equipment Manufacturers 
(OEMs), manufacturer-approved vendors, and non manufacturer-approved sellers. 
The potential benefits of remanufacturing are twofold. First, it extends the useful life 
of a product, thus reduces the demand for new products and environmental burden 
(U.S. EPA 1997, 1998, 2011). Second, it can potentially be a profitable economic 
activity for OEMs, i.e. the residual value inherent in the used products and the cost 
savings from remanufacturing. According to Lund (1996), the size and scope of U.S. 
remanufacturing operations accounted for total sales in excess of $53 billion per year 
with 73,000 companies across over 46 major product categories and 480,000 
employees. In the 2004 survey “Remanufacturing in the UK: a significant contributor 
to sustainable development?” it was estimated that remanufacturing and reuse 
contributed £5 billion per annum to the UK economy (Parker 2004). This survey also 
revealed that each year the UK remanufacturing industry saves 270,000 tonnes of 
materials (mostly metals) from recycling or scrapping, and employs at least 500,000 
people (Parker 2004). 
Guide & Van Wassenhove (2006a, 2009), and Atasu et al. (2008), in their recent 
reviews of Closed-Loop Supply Chains (CLSCs) research, stressed the need for 
research exploring empirical studies of market factors in CLSCs. As noted in Guide & 
Van Wassenhove (2009), research has barely begun to investigate market-related 
issues. A lack of understanding of prices and markets poses barriers to the viability of 
remanufacturing efforts despite the well-designed operational system (Guide & Van 
Wassenhove 2009, p.16). Guide & Van Wassenhove (2009) also note the opportunity 
for such work to lead industry practice since industry has long operated under 
common wisdom rather than systematic empirical studies. Inevitably, the work of 
investigating market-related issues would enable the development of more 
sophisticated and relevant analytical models (e.g. Corbett & Kleindorfer 2001a, 2001b, 
Guide & Van Wassenhove 2006a, 2006b, Kleindorfer et al. 2005). 
In this paper, we study the market determinants of price differentials between 
new and remanufactured products by using data on purchases made on eBay UK. 
We consider Electronics product category, where remanufacturing activities are 
significant and a sufficient number of transactions for both new and corresponding 
remanufactured products can be found. We carry out the empirical analysis by means 
of three linear regression methods: the standard Ordinary Least Square Regression 
(OLSR), Ridge Regression (RR) and Mixed Regression (MR). By applying these 
methods, we are able to control for the presence of collinearity among the 
*Manuscript without title page
Click here to view linked References
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explanatory variables within our dataset. Our empirical results suggest that seller 
positive reputation, the length of warranties provided for remanufactured products, 
the proxies of demand and supply of remanufactured products, the duration and end 
day of remanufactured product listings are important determinants of price 
differentials between new and corresponding remanufactured products. Most 
importantly, we find that seller identity plays an important role as the above 
empirical results are predominantly driven by transactions carried out by non 
manufacturer-approved vendors. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the 
empirical works on market factors in CLSCs. Section 3 and 4 describe our datasets 
and the variables considered in our empirical analysis. In Section 5 and 6 we report 
the results from our preliminary analysis, and introduce the empirical model and the 
methodologies employed. In Section 7 we set out the empirical results together with a 
number of robustness checks. Section 8 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Empirical Work on Market Factors in CLSCs 
 
Guide & Li (2010) study cannibalisation based on online auctions for a consumer 
product and a commercial product to determine consumers’ willingness to pay for 
both new and remanufactured products. For the consumer product, consumers’ 
willingness to pay for the remanufactured product is 15.3% lower than that for the 
new product, and the cannibalisation is not a concern. For the commercial product, 
consumers’ willingness to pay for the remanufactured product is 9.7% lower than that 
for the new product and a certain degree of cannibalisation exists. However, for the 
commercial product it is not conclusive that cannibalisation of new product sales by 
remanufactured products exists because of the significant presence of third-party 
resellers. 
Ovchinnikov (2011) studies pricing and remanufacturing strategy of a firm that 
offers both new and remanufactured versions of its product. A model of demand 
cannibalisation and a behavioural study that estimates the fraction of consumers who 
switch from a new to remanufactured product are presented. This key modelling 
parameter – the fraction of consumers has an inverted-U shape: it first increases and 
subsequently decreases when the price of a remanufactured product becomes very low. 
Despite the fact that a larger portion of consumers are willing to purchase products 
lower than their reference price, some consumers who are unwilling to purchase 
products under their reference price may infer the quality of the remanufactured 
product based on the very low price. 
More recently, Agrawal, Atasu & Ittersum (2012) investigated how the presence 
of remanufactured products and the identity of the remanufacturer (an 
OEM-remanufacturer/ a third-party remanufacturer) influence the perceived value of 
new products. MP3 players (Apple iPod Nanos) and consumer printers (HP Laser-Jet 
P1006) are chosen as the product categories. Through behavioural laboratory 
experiments, in the absence of a third-party remanufacturer the authors found the 
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presence of products remanufactured and sold by the OEM reduces the perceived 
value of new products. 
Subramanian & Subramanyam (2012) study market factors, such as seller 
reputation, identity of sellers of remanufactured products, and warranty strength, 
explained the purchase price differentials between new and remanufactured products. 
The authors report seller reputation significantly explains the price differentials 
between new and remanufactured product. Remanufactured products listed by OEMs 
or their authorised factories are sold at relatively higher prices than product 
remanufactured by individual sellers who do not hold any OEM’s remanufacturing 
authorisation. In the presence of seller reputation and remanufacturer identity, the 
authors find that stronger warranties are not significantly associated with higher prices 
paid for remanufactured products. 
 
2.1. Seller Reputation 
  
 In the literature, there are mixed findings for the effect of seller reputation on 
prices paid for used products (Houser & Wooders 2006, Lucking-Reiley et al 2007, 
Bajari & Hortaçsu 2003, Livingston 2005, Eaton 2007, Melnick & Alm 2002). In 
other words, negative (positive) reputation can either have a negative (positive) effect 
or no effect on used product prices. Although remanufactured products differ 
significantly from used products, the aforementioned literature signalises that seller 
reputation would significantly explain price differentials between new and 
remanufactured products. Subramanian & Subramanyam (2012) report that positive 
(negative) seller reputation for remanufactured products is negatively (positively) 
associated with price differentials. A seller’s reputation can be measured along two 
dimensions: positive and negative (see Resnick et al. 2006 for a review). On eBay, 
buyers can provide positive, neutral or negative feedback. The counts of each type of 
feedback together with textual comments for the past 12 months are reported. The 
literature (Houser & Wooders 2006, Lucking-Reiley et al. 2007, Standifird 2001) 
suggests the feedback counts can be used as appropriate measures for seller reputation. 
Thus, we consider the number of positive feedback counts as a measure of seller 
positive reputation. As suggested by Cabral & Hortaçsu (2010), Resnick & 
Zeckhauser (2002) that market participants perceive neutral feedback negatively, we 
combine the total number of neutral and negative feedback counts as a measure of 
seller negative reputation.  
 
2.2. Seller Identity 
 
Within eBay UK Electronics category, there are two types of sellers listing 
remanufactured products: the manufacturer-approved vendors (professionally restore 
products to working order) and non manufacturer-approved sellers (restore items to 
working order, yet these sellers are not approved by the manufacturers). According to 
eBay UK, regardless of the seller identity, all listed remanufactured products have 
been inspected, cleaned, and repaired to full working order and are in excellent 
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condition. In the literature, very little has been done to examine the consumer 
preference and the price difference between manufacturer-approved vendors and non 
manufacturer-approved sellers. Ferrer & Swaminathan (2006) assume in their 
analytical models that consumers have a higher preference for remanufactured 
products offered by manufacturer-approved vendors, whereas in Ferguson & Toktay 
(2006) consumers do not differentiate the remanufactured product offered by either 
manufacturer-approved or not-approved vendors. However, a buyer may be concerned 
about the remanufacturing process due to the process complexity, technical expertise, 
equipment and capital investment. Subramanian & Subramanyam (2012) find that 
products remanufactured by authorised factories are purchased at relatively higher 
prices than products remanufactured by unauthorised third parties. 
  
2.3. Remanufactured Product Warranty 
 
Product warranty is an important element to take into account when consumers 
consider purchasing a remanufactured product as a substitute for the corresponding 
new product. Recently, the study of Ovchinnikov (2011) found that both 
quality-conscious (high-end) and price-sensitive (low-end) respondents were more 
open to considering a remanufactured product backed by a strong warranty, in 
particular if this warranty came directly from a manufacturer they know and trust. The 
analysis of Subramanian & Subramanyam (2012) shows, in the presence of seller 
reputation and remanufacturer identity, that stronger warranties are not significantly 
associated with higher prices paid for remanufactured products. 
 
2.4. Demand and Supply Proxies 
 
For manufacturer-approved vendors and non manufacturer-approved sellers, there 
are questions about the demand for both new and corresponding remanufactured 
products. Athey & Haile (2002) show that in certain auctions, demand can be 
identified from observing the price and the number of bidders. In eBay, it is possible 
to obtain the information about the number of bidders as well as the number of hit 
counts (the number of times an item has been viewed by potential buyers). Having a 
good understanding of demand of a remanufactured product does not only help set 
either the reserve or buy-it-now price, but also gain a good understanding of what 
remanufactured products are on demand. Subramanian & Subramanyam (2012) find 
that a greater quantity of remanufactured product available from the seller is 
associated with a lower price differential, and the proxy for product demand is 
negatively associated with price differential. Based on these findings, Subramanian & 
Subramanyam (2012) suggest that buyers may perceive a greater quantity available 
for a remanufactured product as evidence of a well established seller, and more 
popular remanufactured products should be discounted less. 
 
3. Data 
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EBay offers a rich set of Application Programme Interfaces (APIs) that allows 
third party vendors to access eBay data and information. The APIs are accessed via 
writing custom software scripts that retrieve information from the online auction site. 
The scripts are written in PHP (Hypertext Preprocessor), a popular server-scripting 
language, while data downloaded is saved in a SQL database, making it possible to 
search and export data easily. The methodology adopted revolves three main steps. 
First, a list of Electronics subcategories consists of 26 subcategories is compiled 
(See Table 1). Next, the application uses eBay's APIs to retrieve listings of products 
for each subcategory. Although it is possible to impose filters in the list, we do not 
apply them as we intend to randomly select products within these subcategories. 
Second, our software iterates around the product listings and downloads all the 
available information provided by eBay. In the final step, an export routine outputs 
the required data in a specified format. 
Insert Table 1 about here. 
Across all product categories on eBay UK, the Electronics product category 
contains a significant number of both new and corresponding remanufactured 
products. Table 1 summarises all subcategories of Electronics product category. From 
18 May to 9 June 2012, we collected a rich transaction-level dataset on new and 
corresponding remanufactured products sold under the eBay UK product category of 
Electronics, across all listing types (both fixed and non-fixed price listings). The 
dataset consists of 352 Electronics product titles. Under each title, there are 
transactions for both new and corresponding remanufactured products. We ensure 
both new and corresponding remanufactured products are exact matches (e.g. same 
product specification: model and version). To compute price differentials (see Section 
4), we ensure that each of the 352 product titles has at least one new product 
transaction and at least one corresponding remanufactured product transaction. Under 
352 product titles, there are 1260 new product transactions and 917 corresponding 
remanufactured product transactions. Thus, our resulting dataset includes a total of 
917 transactions for which we can extract observations for price differentials and 
related determinants, such as the counts of seller positive and negative feedback, the 
length of seller incumbency, the length of warranty offered, proxies for the quantities 
of products supplied by eBay sellers and demanded by eBay buyers, the seller identity 
(manufacturer-approved and non manufacturer-approved vendors), the length of 
listing and listing end time/day, and the availability of return policies. Across our 
dataset, we ensure no identical sellers, i.e. no such sellers who list multiple adverts for 
the same remanufactured product. 
We then partition our entire dataset into two subsamples. The former 
encompasses the Electronics products remanufactured by manufacturer-approved 
vendors and it consists of 481 transactions. The latter contains the products 
remanufactured by non manufacturer-approved sellers and it consists of 436 
transactions. Our aim is to investigate whether the pattern of results obtained for the 
entire dataset still holds when the two partitioned datasets are taken into 
consideration.  
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4. Variables 
 
4.1 Dependent Variable: Price Differentials 
 
We denote the price differential of a remanufactured product transaction as PDt. 
We compute the price differentials PDt, t = {1, 2, …, 917} as the difference between 
the average price of a new product and the price of the corresponding remanufactured 
product, as a fraction of the average price of the new product, according to the 
formula below:  
100% 
Price Average
Price  Price Average
PD
 New
 t Remanuf New
t 


,
   (1) 
Here, the price of a new or a corresponding remanufactured product is referred to as 
the sold price plus the postage charge minus selling fees (including insertion fee and 
final value fee). 
In our dataset the above ratio takes mainly positive values with an upper bound at 
1. However, for some specific transactions the ratio assumes negative values. 
Negative values are possible because there may be certain seller- or 
transaction-related dimensions (such as seller reputation) that may lead a 
remanufactured product to be purchased at a higher price than a corresponding new 
product. In the next Section we discuss the set of explanatory variables that we 
believe are good candidates to explain the variability of price differentials. 
 
4.2 Explanatory Variables and Hypotheses 
 
 Seller reputation: For transaction t, we use the number of positive feedback 
counts (POSREPt) as a measure of seller positive reputation, and the number of 
negative and neural feedback counts (NEGREPt) as a measure of seller negative 
reputation. This enables us to test for the following null hypotheses: 
Hypothesis H1a: Greater positive seller reputation is associated with lower price 
differentials.  
Hypothesis H1b: Greater negative seller reputation is associated with higher price 
differentials. 
Length of seller incumbency: We account for the potential effect of a seller’s 
length of incumbency in eBay on the perceived reputation by customers and, hence, 
on the perceived values of remanufactured products by including INCUMBt as an 
explanatory variable. The length of seller’s incumbency is measured as the number of 
days elapsed from the registration with eBay of sellers to the first day of listing 
products. This makes it possible to test for the following null: 
Hypothesis H2: Longer sellers’ incumbencies are associated with lower price 
differentials. 
Length of warranty: The duration of warranty could affect the purchasing price 
of a remanufactured product. We control for this effect by including the variable 
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WARRt which captures the length of the warranty in months for each remanufactured 
product transaction. The null that we test is the following: 
Hypothesis H3: Longer warranties are associated with higher price differentials. 
Demand and supply proxies: We expect demand and supply factors to exercise 
respectively a negative and positive impact on price differentials. We consider the 
number of hit counts plus the number of bid counts placed for each remanufactured 
product transaction as a proxy of demand factors (DEMt), whereas the available 
quantity of the remanufactured product is referred to as a supply proxy (SUPt). In 
this case the null that we test are the followings: 
Hypothesis H4: Higher demand proxy is associated with lower price differentials. 
Hypothesis H5: Larger quantities available from sellers are associated with higher 
price differentials. 
 Seller identity: We assign MANUFt a value of 1 if the remanufactured product 
transaction is carried out by a manufacturer-approved vendor, and 0 otherwise, so that 
we can test the following null: 
Hypothesis H6: Products remanufactured by manufacturer-approved vendors are 
associated with lower price differentials. 
Duration: The length of advertisement of listed products might have an impact on 
the price paid for a remanufactured product. A possible reason is that a longer 
availability of a product on eBay enables a more careful assessment by potential 
buyers. Accordingly, we control for this pattern by including the explanatory variable 
DURATt measured as the number of days elapsed since a certain remanufactured 
product is first listed. The null that we test in this case is the following: 
Hypothesis H7: Longer listing durations are associated with lower price differentials. 
Listing end time/day: Prior research has discussed the possibility that the ending 
time of an eBay listing may be associated with the price paid (Lucking-Reiley et al. 
2007, Simonsohn 2010). A reason is the potentially closer attention paid by buyers 
during weekends or night time (non-work) hours. Accordingly, we control for these 
patterns by considering two dummy indicators: WKNDt, which captures whether the 
listing end time for a remanufactured product transaction was at weekends (Saturday 
or Sunday), and NIGHTt, which captures whether the listing end time for the same 
transaction was during night hours (from 6pm to 6am). We assign WKNDt a value of 1 
if the ending time of a remanufactured product transaction is at weekends, and 0 
otherwise. We assign NIGHTt a value of 1 if the ending time of a remanufactured 
product j is between 6pm and 6am, and 0 otherwise. Thus, the following two null are 
tested: 
Hypothesis H8a: Remanufactured product listings end at weekends are associated with 
higher price differentials. 
Hypothesis H8b: Remanufactured products listings end during night hours are 
associated with higher price differentials. 
Return Policy: We assign the RETURNt values equal to 1 if a remanufactured 
product can be accepted for return by vendors, and 0 otherwise. In this case, the null 
under analysis is the following: 
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Hypothesis H9: Remanufactured products with a return policy are associated with 
lower price differentials. 
 
5. Preliminary Analysis 
 
We start our analysis by carrying out some preliminary statistics. The upper panel 
of Table 2 reports basic statistics for the eleven candidate explanatory variables used 
in the regression analysis whereas the lower panel sets out the pair wise correlation 
indices together with the relative eigenvalues. These values suggest that the 
explanatory variables are loosely correlated, with the only exception being POSREP 
and NEGREP for which the correlation index is 0.946. (The partial correlation index 
between these two variables calculates to 0.957.) Such result is also supported by the 
eigenvalues of the design matrix. If all the independent variables in the dataset were 
uncorrelated, all the eleven eigenvalues would be equal to unity. The greater the pair 
wise correlations, the wider the eigenvalue spectrum. In Table 2, the first ten 
eigenvalues account for approximately 99 percent of the total, so that almost all of the 
variation in the eleven independent variables can be represented in ten dimensions 
only. These figures suggest that collinearity might plague empirical estimates 
obtained by applying standard OLSR. In Section 6, we present a brief outline of Ridge 
Regression (RR) and Mixed Regression (MR) methods as statistical tools which can 
be used to mitigate the issue of collinearity. 
Insert Table 2 about here 
The upper panel of Table 3 shows that the mean of price differentials (0.100) as 
defined in Eq. (1) is positive and statistically different from 0. However, the large 
standard deviation (0.281) suggests that it is not rare to have negative differentials for 
specific products. In fact, about 10 percent of observations in our dataset present 
negative price differentials. We then compute the mean and standard deviation of the 
price differentials for the two partitioned datasets previously defined. These results, 
summarised in the upper panel of Table 3, are similar to the mean and standard 
deviation for the unpartitioned dataset. 
Insert Table 3 about here 
In Fig. 1, we plot the kernel probability distribution of price differentials for the 
two partitioned datasets. The two kernel distributions are characterised by similar 
means but different shapes. Statistical tests for equality in mean, median, variance and 
distributions are then used to investigate whether the price differentials between the 
two partitioned datasets are indeed different. The results reported in the lower panel of 
Table 3 suggest that the null of equality in median (Mann-Whitney test), variance 
(Levene test) and distributions (Barnett-Eisen and Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests) are 
soundly rejected at standard significance levels. Similarly, the Chow test soundly 
rejects the null of equality between linear regressions fitted to the two partitioned 
subsamples. Ghilagaber (2004) shows the Chow test presents good size and power as 
long as the sample sizes are similar and heteroscedasticity is moderate. We note that 
the White tests reported in Tables 4-6 actually suggest weak forms of 
heteroscedasticity. All in all, the above results suggest that price differentials for items 
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sold by manufacturer-approved and non manufacturer-approved vendors present 
different stochastic properties.  
Insert Fig. 1 about here 
 
6. Empirical Model and Methodology 
 
In line with previous studies, we allow the possibility that the relationship 
between price differentials and their determinants set out in Section 4 is nonlinear by 
using a log-log transformation of both the dependent and explanatory variables. For 
instance, as highlighted by Subramanian & Subramanyam (2012) it seems reasonable 
to expect that higher levels of positive (negative) seller reputation are associated with 
lower (higher) price differentials with a diminishing effect. Therefore, we consider the 
following model specification: 
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The above log-log specification has two desirable features. First, the 
transformation of the dependent variable is directionally consistent with price 
differentials. Second, the slope coefficients in Eq.(2) can be interpreted as elasticities. 
We carry out empirical estimations of Eq.(2) by using standard heteroscedasticity 
consistent (Eicher-White) OLSR estimators. However, as highlighted in Section 5, the 
presence of collinearity among the explanatory variables is a statistical issue that 
potentially impairs OLSR empirical estimates. Multicollinearity, by inflating the 
standard errors of parameter estimates, might reduce the statistical and economic 
significance of our results. For this reason, we correct the undesirable effects of 
multicollinearity by re-estimating our log-log regression using Ridge Regression (RR) 
method. In contrast to the standard OLSR estimators, RR methods add a constant k to 
each diagonal element of the cross-product matrix of the explanatory variables before 
it is inverted (see Hoerl, Kennard & Baldwin 1975). While this introduces bias into 
the coefficient estimates, the inflated variances are simultaneously reduced. Extensive 
Monte Carlo simulation experiments support the use of RR when the independent 
variables are highly correlated, and several successful applications of ridge analysis 
have been reported (see Annaert et al 2013). We then carry out empirical estimates of 
Eq.(2) by using a third method based on Theil’s (1971) Mixed Regression (MR). The 
mixed estimation technique is a method of combining sample data with prior linear 
stochastic constraints on the parameters of the model. Its principal advantages over 
standard OLSR are that, under appropriate circumstances, MR estimators are superior 
in Mean Squared Error and it is a valid method for mitigating the effects of 
multicollinearity (see Belsey, Kuh, & Welsh 1980). 
 
7. Empirical Results 
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7.1. Empirical Results of the Unpartitioned Dataset: OLSR  
 
The average value of price differentials in our dataset is 10 percent (see Table 3). 
Standard t-statistics are used to investigate whether the price differentials are 
significantly greater than zero. The statistic calculates to 10.87 and it provides strong 
indication of positive price differentials. These results are in line with those already 
found in Guide & Li (2010). A similar pattern of results is obtained when the entire 
dataset is partitioned into the two subsamples: remanufactured products sold by 
manufacturer-approved vendors and non manufacturer-approved vendors. 
Seller reputation: Table 4 column 3 reports standard OLSR empirical estimates 
of Eq.(2) together with a battery of diagnostic tests for heteroscedasticity and model 
specification. The impacts of both positive and negative seller reputation on price 
differentials have the expected signs. However, only the former explanatory variable 
is statistically significant. More specifically, we find that greater positive seller 
reputation is significantly associated with lower price differentials (α2
 
=-0.028, 
p-value=0.03), and greater negative seller reputation is associated with higher price 
differentials (α3
 
=0.0167, p-value=0.18). Thus, these results provide strong support 
for the hypothesis H1a whereas for H1b the evidence is weaker. Using the OLSR 
regression estimates and with all the other explanatory variables set at their average 
values, we find that an increase in positive seller feedback by 10 percent from the 
mean is associated with a 1.85 percent decrease in price differentials, whereas an 
increase by 1 standard deviation is associated with a 71 percent decrease in price 
differentials. We compare the magnitude of the impacts on price differentials of both 
positive and negative seller reputation. This is a useful exercise even though we have 
already known that the latter explanatory variable is not significant at standard 
significance levels. Other thing being equal, an increase of negative seller feedback 
from its mean by 10 percent and 1 standard deviation is associated, respectively, with 
increases of 1.08 and 133 percent in price differentials. Thus, for equal increases in 
the counts of positive and negative seller feedback of the order of 10 percent the 
impact of positive seller feedback more than offset that of negative so that price 
differentials narrow. On the contrary, for equal increases of the order of 1 standard 
deviation price differentials widen. All in all, the above results suggest that for the 
UK market the positive seller reputation has stronger impact on price differentials 
than negative seller reputation does. It follows that sellers with poor reputation do 
not have to provide necessarily significant price breaks to support their selling of 
remanufactured products Sellers with positive reputation can benefit from wider 
mark-up, thus, customer policies are important key element of e-business such as 
eBay. This pattern of results is similar to those already obtained by Subramanian
 
& 
Subramanyam (2012) using data on eBay US. 
Length of seller incumbency, length of warranty, seller identity: The empirical 
results suggest that buyers are not willing to pay higher prices for remanufactured 
products sold by sellers with longer eBay incumbency, for remanufactured products 
covered by longer warranties, as well as for products remanufactured by 
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manufacturer-approved vendors. The estimated parameters α4 (-0.0086), α5 (0.0005) 
and α8 (-0.0272) present the expected sign yet are not statistically significant at 
standard significance levels, so that we do not find any support for the hypothesis H2, 
H3 and H6 respectively. 
Demand and supply proxies: Moreover, empirical results suggest that supply 
and demand of remanufactured products are important determinants of price 
differentials. In fact, we find support for the hypothesis H5 that larger quantities of 
remanufactured products available from sellers are associated with higher price 
differentials (α7
 
= 0.0021, p-value=0.07). An increase in the quantities available by 
10 percent from the mean is associated with a 0.38 percent increase in price 
differentials, whereas an increase by 1 standard deviation is associated with an 
increase of 16.12 percent. Moreover, the proxy for product demand is negatively 
associated with price differentials (α6=-0.0001, p-value=0.08), suggesting that 
popular remanufactured products are sold at higher prices. In other words, higher 
demand proxies for remanufactured products are associated with lower price 
differentials. We note that an increase in demand proxies by 10 percent is associated 
with a 0.54 percent decrease in price differentials, whereas an increase by 1 standard 
deviation is associated with a decrease of 11.86 percent. The above results suggest 
that both the hypotheses H4 and H5 hold. 
Listing end time/day and duration: Furthermore, we find that remanufactured 
product listings that end at weekends (Saturday or Sunday) or during night time hours 
(6pm until 6am) are associated with higher price differentials. The former type of 
listing is strongly significant whereas the latter is not (α9
 
=0.1158, p-value=0.01 and 
α10
 
= 0.0277, p-value = 0.29, respectively). This could be attributed to more careful 
assessments by buyers of the competitiveness among products listed and alternative 
offerings during weekends or night time hours. We also control for the impact of the 
length of advert of listed products on price differentials and we find that it is not 
significant at standard significance levels (α11
 
=-0.0021, p-value = 0.19). 
Return policy: However, buyers are willing to pay a premium for remanufactured 
products with an accepted return policy (α12=-0.089, p-value=0.02). This finding 
confirms the hypothesis H9. We find that the availability of return policies is 
associated with a 46.11 percent decrease in price differentials. 
In the bottom panel of Table 4 we compute a battery of diagnostic tests to 
investigate whether the model of Eq.(2) is correctly specified. The White and RESET 
statistics fail to reject the null of homoscedasticity and that there are no specification 
errors at standard significance levels, whereas the F-test for the null that all the 
explanatory variables included in the linear regression are jointly not statistically 
significant is soundly rejected. All in all, the above statistics suggest that the model of 
Eq.(2) is reasonable well specified. 
Insert Table 4 about here 
 
7.2. Empirical Results of the Unpartitioned Dataset: RR and MR  
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Following the empirical results set out in Table 3, we compute two further 
measures of multicollinearity, the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) and the maximum 
condition index. The two measures calculate, respectively, to 13.18 and 55.65 and 
provide therefore further supporting evidence for the presence of multicollineary. 
Since the lack of statistical significance of explanatory variables such as negative 
seller reputation might be a by-product of multicollinearity, we re-estimate Eq.(2) by 
using RR and MR methodologies which can deliver empirical estimates while 
controlling for ill-conditioned information matrix. RR and MR empirical estimates of 
Eq.(2) are reported in the fourth and fifth column of Table 4.  
More specifically, we carry RR estimates by introducing a constant parameter k 
in the estimators of α2 and α3, whereas we leave unaffected the remaining cohort of 
parameters characterising Eq.(2). A critical aspect of the application of RR is the 
choice of the parameter k. A simple criteria used in the literature is to construct the 
so-called Ridge Traces which plot the parameter estimates as functions of k. The 
potential instability in the estimates induced by multicollinearity can be assessed by 
looking whether large movements in the parameter estimates occur as k increases in 
small increments from zero. It has been suggested that visual judgment of stability is 
used to select the optimal value of k. Along with the graphical inspection we make use 
of a number of other methods to estimate the optimal k as proposed by Hoerl & 
Kennard (1970), Hoerl, Kennard & Baldwin (1975), Lawless & Wang (1976) and 
Kibria (2003). The first three criteria suggest a value of k equal to, respectively, 4.6, 
3.7 and 5.1 whereas the last criterion in Kibria (2003) sets a lower value equal to 0.3. 
The Ridge Trace reported in Fig. 2 plots the t-ratios for the parameter α2 and α3 and it 
shows that they are relatively stable for values of k larger than 0.7. Thus we decide to 
report empirical estimates of RR when the parameter k is equal to 0.8. RR estimates of 
Eq.(2) (see Table 4 column 4) are very similar to the OLSR estimates in terms of both 
sign and magnitude of the parameters, with only small differences of the order of 10ˉ3. 
Insert Fig. 2 about here 
Following our empirical results, we re-estimate Eq.(2) by using MR methods. 
Empirical estimates are carried out by feeding the estimation procedure with priors for 
the values of parameters taken from Subramanian
 
& Subramanyam (2012). The 
empirical results are set out in the fifth column of Table 4. Also in this case MR 
estimates are similar to both OLSR and RR parameters in terms of sign and 
magnitude, with marginal differences of the order of 10ˉ3. The similarity between 
OLSR, RR and MR estimates suggest that the form of multicollinearity which affects 
both positive and negative seller reputation does not seem to induce any significant 
bias in the empirical estimates of Eq.(2). 
 
7.3. Empirical Results for the Two Partitioned Datasets: Non 
Manufacturer-Approved Vendors  
 
The empirical results set out in Table 3 suggest that price differentials of 
remanufactured products sold by manufacturer-approved and non 
manufacturer-approved vendors are characterised by two different probability 
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distribution functions (see Fig. 1). Thus, in this Section we investigate whether the 
pattern of results obtained in Table 4 still holds when the entire dataset is partitioned 
into two subsamples (see Section 3 for detail).  
We begin our analysis by re-estimating Eq.(2) for transactions carried out by non 
manufacturer-approved vendors. Standard OLSR, RR and MR estimates together with 
a battery of diagnostic statistics are reported in the third, fourth and fifth column of 
Table 5. Also in this case, the impacts of both positive and negative seller reputation 
on price differentials have the expected signs, with only the former explanatory 
variable statistically significant (α2=-0.0395, p-value=0.04). Thus, greater positive 
reputation is significantly associated with lower price differentials. We find that an 
increase in positive seller feedback by 10 percent from the mean is associated with a 
2.94 percent decrease in price differentials, whereas an increase by 1 standard 
deviation is associated with an 80.39 percent decrease. By comparing the magnitude 
of the impacts on price differentials between positive and negative seller reputation, 
price differentials narrow for equal increases of the order of 10 percent whereas price 
differentials widen for increases of the order of 1 standard deviation.  
All in all, for non manufacturer-approved sellers the results suggest that positive 
seller reputation has stronger impact on price differentials than negative seller 
reputation does. In addition, our empirical results suggest that buyers are willing to 
pay higher prices for products covered by warranties (α5=-0.0078, p-value=0.03) 
offered by non manufacturer-approved sellers but not for products sold by these 
sellers who have longer eBay incumbency, or for which return policies are available. 
Thus, for non manufacturer-approved vendors both seller reputation and provision of 
warranties are important determinants of price differentials, whereas both length of 
incumbency and return policy availability play negligible roles. By holding other 
explanatory variables equal to their means, we find that an increase by 10 percent in 
the length of warranty from the mean is associated with a 0.79 percent decrease in 
price differentials, whereas an increase by 1 standard deviation is associated with a 
decrease of 20.39 percent. 
Empirical results suggest that the proxies of supply and demand for 
remanufactured products are important determinants of price differentials. Larger 
available quantities of remanufactured products supplied by non 
manufacturer-approved sellers are associated with a higher price differentials (α7
 
= 
0.0052, p-value=0.01) whereas higher demand is negatively associated with lower 
price differentials (α6=-0.0002, p-value=0.04). The impacts of increases in supply and 
demand on price differentials are similar in magnitude to those reported in Section 7.1 
for the unpartitioned dataset. For the remanufactured product listed by non 
manufacturer-approved sellers we find that the end of listings during weekend is 
associated with higher price differentials whereas the end of listings during night time 
hours do not play a significant effect (α9
 
=0.1078, p-value =0.06 and α10
 
=-0.0205, 
p-value = 0.63, respectively). Unlike previous results, we find that the length of advert 
of listed remanufactured products by non manufacturer-approved sellers is statistically 
significant (α11
 
=-0.0079, p-value=0.01) and is negatively associated with price 
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differentials. This implies that a longer period of product listings increases the number 
of bids so that the price of remanufactured products can be potentially increased.  
Insert Table 5 about here 
 
7.4. Empirical Results of the Two Partitioned Datasets: Manufacturer-Approved 
Vendors  
 
We carry out a similar analysis by re-estimating Eq.(2) for the second partitioned 
dataset which only includes transactions of remanufactured products by 
manufacturer-approved vendors. Empirical estimates are reported in the third, forth 
and fifth column of Table 6. Surprisingly, we find that the variables that used to be 
significant determinants of price differentials for the unpartitioned dataset as well as 
the partitioned dataset for non manufacturer-approved sellers become not significant 
when the partitioned dataset contains only manufacturer-approved vendors. Thus, the 
pattern of results obtained in Table 4 for the aggregate dataset is substantially driven 
by the trading of remanufactured products carried out by non manufacturer-approved 
sellers. It follows that price differentials of manufacturer-approved sellers must be 
driven by different yet less obvious determinants not considered in our set of 
explanatory variables. Other features of the transactions of remanufactured products 
such as whether the vendor is a well-established/well-known retailer, or the number of 
sales completed might play an important role in the present context. 
In Table 6, empirical estimates suggest that the availability of return policies is 
associated with a decrease in price differentials. Another important observation 
between the two partitioned datasets is that return policies did not seem to matter for 
the remanufactured products sold by non manufacturer-approved sellers, yet did 
matter for the remanufactured products sold by manufacturer-approved vendors. We 
also find that remanufactured product listings end at weekends or during night time 
hours are associated with higher price differentials. 
Finally, we re-estimate Eq.(2) on the second partitioned dataset by using RR and 
MR methods. Empirical estimates are carried out by setting the parameter k = 0.8 and 
by feeding the MR estimators with priors taken from the parameter estimates of Table 
4. The criteria previously set out suggest values of k similar to those reported for the 
unpartitioned dataset. Moreover, Ridge Traces shows that the parameters α2 and α3 
become pretty stable for values larger than 0.6. Thus, we decide to carry out RR 
estimates of Eq.(2) with k=0.8. Such evidence holds for both the partitioned datasets. 
Ridge Traces and detailed computations of k are not reported to save space but are 
available from the authors upon request. Empirical results are set out in the fourth and 
fifth column of Tables 5 and 6. Both RR and MR estimates are similar to OLSR 
parameters in terms of signs and magnitudes, with marginal differences of the order of 
10ˉ3. Thus, when the partitions of the dataset are considered, the similarity among 
empirical estimates suggests that the presence of multicollinearity does not induce any 
significant bias in the estimation of Eq.(2). We compute the White and RESET 
statistics which fail to reject the null of homoscedasticity and no specification errors at 
standard significance levels. The F-test soundly rejects the null that the explanatory 
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variables are jointly not statistically significant. All in all, the above diagnostic tests 
suggest that the model of Eq.(2) is reasonably well specified when applied to the two 
partitioned datasets.  
Insert Table 6 about here 
 
7.5. Robustness Checks 
 
We carry out a number of robustness checks for the empirical estimates reported 
in Table 4. We initially re-estimate Eq.(2) where the dependent variable is restricted 
to assume positive values only. By dropping the transactions for which the dependent 
variable is negative we reduce the number of observations from 917 to 649. We then 
re-estimate Eq.(2) on a restricted dataset in which POSREPt assumes values within its 
mean plus/minus three times its standard deviation. In this case the number of 
observations available reduces to 770. The above exercises enable us to investigate 
whether the pattern of results previously obtained are driven by the presence of 
negative price differentials or outliers in the measure of positive reputation. Finally, 
we carry out a final robustness check by replacing in Eq.(2) the separate positive and 
negative reputation measures with a single reputation score calculated as the 
difference between the two. The above empirical exercises are then repeated for the 
two partitioned datasets. All in all, the empirical results suggest that the sign, 
magnitude and statistical significance of the estimated parameters are by large 
consistent with those set out in Tables from 4 to 6. (Please note these empirical results 
are not reported but are available from the authors upon request.) 
 
8. Conclusions 
 
We studied the market determinants of price differentials between new and 
corresponding remanufactured products in Electronics by using data on purchases 
made on eBay UK. We carried out the empirical analysis by using Ordinary Least 
Square Regression, Ridge Regression (RR) method to deal with the statistical issue 
of collinearity among the explanatory variables, and Mixed Regression (MR) 
method. Our empirical results suggested seller positive reputation, the length of 
warranties, the proxies of demand and supply of remanufactured products, the 
duration and end day of remanufactured product listings are important market 
determinants of price differentials. More specifically, we found seller identity (i.e. 
manufacturer-approved or non manufacturer-approved vendors) played an important 
role as our empirical results were predominantly driven by transactions carried out 
by non manufacturer-approved vendors. We can conclude price differentials of 
remanufactured products listed by manufacturer-approved sellers must be driven by 
a different set of market determinants not available in our dataset. This leads to an 
interesting area of further study to investigate these less obvious market 
determinants for remanufactured product transactions carried out by 
manufacturer-approved vendors. 
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Table 1  Subcategories of Electronics product category 
 
Table 2  Descriptive statistics and correlation indices 
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Table 4  Linear regressions for log transformation of price differentials 
 
Table 5  Linear regressions for log transformation of price differentials 
(MANUFt=0) 
 
Table 6  Linear regressions for log transformation of price differentials 
(MANUFt=1) 
 
Figure 1  Empirical probability distribution functions of price differentials for 
manufacturer-approved sellers (solid line) and non 
manufacturer-approved sellers (dotted line) 
 
Figure 2  Ridge Trace for the t-ratios of parameters α2 (ln(POSREPt) solid line) 
and α3 (ln(NEGREPt) dotted line) estimated on the unpartitioned dataset. 
Values of the statistics reported on the vertical axis and values of k on 
the horizontal axis. 
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Table 1 Subcategories of Electronics product category 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Subcategories of Electronics 
Index Subcategory Title Index Subcategory Title 
1 Digital cameras 14 Headsets 
2 Camcorders 15 Chargers & Docks 
3 Camera & Photo Accessories 16 Televisions 
4 Lenses & Filters 17 DVD, Blue ray & home cinema 
5 Digital Photo Frames 18 TV Reception & Set-Top Boxes 
6 Laptops & netbooks 19 TV & Home Audio Accessories 
7 Desktops & All-in-Ones 20 iPods & MP3 players 
8 iPads, Tablets & eReaders 21 Headphones 
9 Printers, Scanners & Supplies 22 Home Audio & HiFi Separates 
10 Home networking 23 Consoles 
11 Computer Components & Parts 24 Accessories 
12 Mobiles & smart phones 25 Controllers 
13 Home Phones & Accessories 26 Headsets 
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics and correlation indices 
 
 POSREP NEGREP INCUMB WARR SUP DEMAND MANUF DURAT WKND NIGHT RETURN 
Mean 9803 57 1635 1.615 2.534 70.460 0.525 8.231 0.300 0.486 0.555 
Std Error 51628 573 1231 3.703 10.034 171.600 0.500 14.429 0.458 0.571 0.497 
Min 0 0 13 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Max 815446 9904 4932 24 213 2614 1 192 1 8 1 
Observations 917 917 917 917 917 917 917 917 917 917 917 
            
POSREP 1.000           
NEGREP 0.946 1.000          
INCUMB 0.227 0.132 1.000         
WARR 0.163 0.029 0.126 1.000        
SUP 0.119 0.045 0.025 0.121 1.000       
DEM -0.016 -0.007 0.057 0.004 0.335 1.000      
MANUF 0.082 0.059 0.097 0.080 0.004 -0.055 1.000     
DURAT 0.040 -0.005 0.106 0.071 0.313 0.154 0.085 1.000    
WKND 0.008 0.031 0.114 -0.044 -0.024 0.076 -0.049 0.038 1.000   
NIGHT -0.039 -0.023 -0.019 -0.060 -0.057 -0.044 -0.034 -0.093 0.051 1.000  
RETURN 0.167 0.087 0.178 0.341 0.126 0.070 -0.141 0.193 -0.037 -0.083 1.000 
            
Eigenvalues
 
2.198 1.647 1.219 1.121 1.088 0.95 0.813 0.794 0.608 0.52 0.039 
Notes:  
Descriptive statistics for the explanatory variables included in Eq. (2) (see Section 6). 
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Table 3 Price differentials: basic statistics 
 
 Price Differentials Price Differentials Price Differentials 
 
Include both  
manufacturer-approved 
and non 
manufacturer-approved 
vendors 
(MANUFt = 1) 
Only include  
manufacturer-approved 
vendors 
 
(MANUFt = 0) 
Only include non 
manufacturer-approved 
vendors 
 
Mean 0.100 0.094 0.109 
SD 0.281 0.251 0.312 
t-stat
1 10.87 8.198 7.303 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 917 481 436 
Equality Mean
2 -0.595 
 (0.302) 
Equality Median
3 -1.864 
 (0.031) 
Equality Variance
4 18.38 
 (0.000) 
Equality Distrib
5 27.22 
 (0.000) 
K-S Test
6 0.111 
 (0.000) 
Chow Test
7 34.42 
 (0.000) 
Notes:  
1. t-statistics for the null of population mean equals to 0. 
2. 2-sample t-statistics for the null of equality in mean. P-value is in parenthesis. 
3. Mann-Whitney Test for the null of equality in median. P-value is in parenthesis. 
4. Levene test for the null of equality in variance. P-value is in parenthesis. 
5. Barnett & Eisen (1982) test for the null of equality in distribution. P-value is in parenthesis. 
6. Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test for the null of equality in distribution. P-value is in parenthesis. 
7. Chow Test for the null of equality between two sets of coefficients in two linear regression models. 
P-value is in parenthesis. Test is computed by fitting Eq.(2) to the two partitioned datasets. 
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Table 4 Linear regressions for log transformation of price differentials 
Explanatory Variable Parameter 
Log-Normal Regression (SD 
in parenthesis) 
Ridge Regression (SD in 
parenthesis) 
Mixed regression (SD in 
parenthesis) 
POSREP (ln) α2 -0.028** -0.028** -0.028** 
  (0.0128) (0.0128) (0.0128) 
NEGREP (ln) α3 0.0167 0.0166 0.0167 
  (0.0125) (0.0125) (0.0125) 
INCUMB (ln) α4 -0.0086 -0.0087 -0.0086 
  (0.0231) (0.0231) (0.0231) 
WARR α5 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 
  (0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0036) 
DEM (ln) α6 -0.0001* -0.0001* -0.0001* 
  (0.00006) (0.00006) (0.00006) 
SUP (ln) α7 0.0021* 0.0021* 0.0021* 
  (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) 
MANUF α8 -0.0272 -0.0272 -0.0272 
  (0.0336) (0.0336) (0.0336) 
WKND α9 0.1158** 0.1157** 0.1157** 
  (0.0451) (0.0451) (0.0450) 
NIGHT α10 0.0277 0.0277 0.0277 
  (0.0261) (0.0261) (0.0261) 
DURAT α11 -0.0021 -0.0021 -0.0021 
  (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0016) 
RETURN α12 -0.0893** -0.0894** -0.0893** 
  (0.0393) (0.0393) (0.0393) 
Intercept α1 0.4234*** 0.4234*** 0.4244*** 
  (0.1471) (0.1470) (0.1471) 
Model Fit1  37.35 37.35 40.78 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
White Heter2  64.63 64.66 64.37 
  (0.175) (0.174) (0.181) 
RESET Test3  2.396 2.398 2.393 
  (0.091) (0.092) (0.092) 
R²  0.166 0.166 0.166 
Observations  917 917 917 
Notes: Dependent variable defined as -ln(1-PDt). * (**) [***] Significant at 10 (5) [1] percent. Ridge regression (RR) estimated with parameter k=0.8. 
Mixed regression (MR) estimated with priors taken from Subramanian and Subramanyam (2012). 
1 F-test for the null that all the regressions are jointly not statistically significant. P-value is in parenthesis. 
2 White heteroscedasticity test for the null of homoscedasticity. P-value is in parenthesis. 
3 RESET test for the null of no specification errors. P-value is in parenthesis. 
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Table 5 Linear regressions for log transformation of price differentials (MANUFt=0) 
Explanatory Variable Parameter 
Log-Normal Regression (SD 
in parenthesis) 
Ridge Regression (SD in 
parenthesis) 
Mixed regression (SD in 
parenthesis) 
POSREP (ln) α2 -0.0395** -0.0394** -0.0395** 
  (0.0197) (0.0196) (0.0196) 
NEGREP (ln) α3 0.0179 0.0179 0.0179 
  (0.0206) (0.0206) (0.0206) 
INCUMB (ln) α4 -0.0017 -0.0018 -0.0018 
  (0.0329) (0.0328) (0.0329) 
WARR α5 -0.0078** -0.0078** -0.0078** 
  (0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0035) 
DEM (ln) α6 -0.0002** -0.0002** -0.0018** 
  (0.00009) (0.00009) (0.00009) 
SUP (ln) α7 0.0052*** 0.0051*** 0.0052*** 
  (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019) 
MANUF α8 - - - 
  (-) (-) (-) 
WKND α9 0.1078* 0.1078* 0.1079* 
  (0.0581) (0.0581) (0.0579) 
NIGHT α10 -0.0205 -0.0205 -0.0204 
  (0.0432) (0.0434) (0.0431) 
DURAT α11 -0.0079*** -0.0079*** -0.0078*** 
  (0.0029) (0.0030) (0.0030) 
RETURN α12 -0.0632 -0.0633 -0.0632 
  (0.0594) (0.0594) (0.0595) 
Intercept α1 0.5002** 0.5002** 0.5002** 
  (0.2184) (0.2181) (0.2183) 
Model Fit1  30.93 30.93 30.94 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
White Heter2  56.37 56.37 56.37 
  (0.164) (0.164) (0.164) 
RESET Test3  1.372 1.372 1.372 
  (0.254) (0.254) (0.291) 
R²  0.21 0.21 0.21 
Observations  436 436 436 
Notes: Dependent variable defined as -ln(1-PDt). * (**) [***] Significant at 10 (5) [1] percent. Ridge regression (RR) estimated with parameter k=0.8. 
Mixed regression (MR) estimated with priors taken from empirical estimates of Table 4. 
1 F-test for the null that all the regressions are jointly not statistically significant. P-value is in parenthesis. 
2 White heteroscedasticity test for the null of homoscedasticity. P-value is in parenthesis. 
3 RESET test for the null of no specification errors. P-value is in parenthesis. 
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Table 6 Linear regressions for log transformation of price differentials (MANUFt=1) 
Explanatory Variable Parameter 
Log-Normal Regression (SD 
in parenthesis) 
Ridge Regression (SD in 
parenthesis) 
Mixed regression (SD in 
parenthesis) 
POSREP (ln) α2 -0.0188 -0.0188 -0.0188 
  (0.0172) (0.0171) (0.0171) 
NEGREP (ln) α3 0.0121 0.0121 0.0121 
  (0.0159) (0.0159) (0.0160) 
INCUMB (ln) α4 -0.0133 -0.0133 -0.0133 
  (0.0315) (0.0315) (0.0315) 
WARR α5 0.0036 0.0036 0.0036 
  (0.0056) (0.0056) (0.0056) 
DEM (ln) α6 -0.00006 -0.00006 -0.00006 
  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
SUP (ln) α7 0.0015 0.0014 0.0015 
  (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0019) 
MANUF α8 - - - 
  (-) (-) (-) 
WKND α9 0.129* 0.129* 0.1289* 
  (0.0688) (0.0688) (0.0687) 
NIGHT α10 0.0606* 0.0606* 0.0606* 
  (0.0348) (0.0348) (0.0347) 
DURAT α11 -0.001 -0.0009 -0.001 
  (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0016) 
RETURN α12 -0.1059** -0.1059** -0.1059** 
  (0.0524) (0.0524) (0.0524) 
Intercept α1 0.3513* 0.3511* 0.3513* 
  (0.1909) (0.1909) (0.1908) 
Model Fit1  21.02 21.02 21.04 
  (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
White Heter2  49.61 49.61 49.62 
  (0.644) (0.644) (0.642) 
RESET Test3  2.8 2.028 2.026 
  (0.063) (0.132) (0.133) 
R²  0.144 0.144 0.144 
Observations  481 481 481 
Notes: Dependent variable defined as -ln(1-PDt). * (**) [***] Significant at 10 (5) [1] percent. Ridge regression (RR) estimated with parameter k=0.8. 
Mixed regression (MR) estimated with priors taken from empirical estimates of Table 4. 
1 F-test for the null that all the regressions are jointly not statistically significant. P-value is in parenthesis. 
2 White heteroscedasticity test for the null of homoscedasticity. P-value is in parenthesis. 
3 RESET test for the null of no specification errors. P-value is in parenthesis. 
 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
26 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 Empirical probability distribution functions of price differentials for 
manufacturer-approved sellers (solid line) and non manufacturer-approved sellers 
(dotted line) 
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Figure 2 Ridge Trace for the t-ratios of parameters α2 (ln(POSREPt) solid line) and α3 
(ln(NEGREPt) dotted line) estimated on the unpartitioned dataset. Values of the 
statistics reported on the vertical axis and values of k on the horizontal axis. 
